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At the time that 16th Century French essayist Michel de Montaigne was writing his famous Essays, medicine was undergoing its most profound changes since Galen. Major works of anatomical study such as Vasalius’ On the Fabric of the Human Body (1543) were refashioning medicine as a scientific pursuit increasingly based on empirical evidence gleaned from direct observation of the inner-workings of the human body. Older models of humoral medicine, which were primarily based on information inferred from animal studies and the externally observable phenomena of human bodies, were still dominant but were under scrutiny as some of their key suppositions (the structure of the heart and liver, the central node of the circulatory system) were being disproven. Physicians and surgeons, working with a greater number of human cadavers used dissections (which, breaking with tradition, they performed themselves) to answer the unresolved and now disputed questions of their field, such as the location of the human soul or the function of the arteries and veins. Their findings eventually allowed a new medical paradigm based first and foremost on the body as a primarily physical entity to emerge, but at this early stage it could still not furnish answers convincing enough to topple the system based on humors and their effect on temperament. Given this uncertainty and the considerable esteem placed in Galenic medicine, even the innovators of this new approach were reluctant to embrace an understanding of the body that saw it as nothing but an assemblage of mechanical parts that had no influence on emotion or disposition.
Montaigne’s writings, both directly and indirectly, weigh in on the changes taking place in medicine and tentatively err on the side of humoral medicine and Galenic paradigms. Citing his own experience with kidney stones, he opines about the value of personal experience in determining sound medical care at the same time as he commends the verifiability of surgery as opposed to medicine. It is, however, through the numerous personal and historical anecdotes about illness that the essayist cautions his reader about both blind adherence to traditional medicine and the poorly considered adoption of new models. The musings on medicine and pathology, a word whose roots tellingly denote both emotions and disease, center on the interplay of body and mind and take the form of word play on terms such as “humeur,” “patient,” and “pensement”. The author’s characteristic punning creates instances of lexical and semantic ambiguity between cognitive and curative meanings and creates palimpsests of signification that alternately privilege the mind’s control over the body and the body’s government of self-perception and resultant actions. This vacillation, typical of The Essays, need not be taken as a failing of the author to present a consistent thesis, but should rather be seen, in the truest sense of the genre Montaigne invented, as a means of assaying a variety of ideas in response to the complicated problems posed by the rapid evolution of medical knowledge.

*     *     *

The Renaissance was, in medicine as in many other areas, a time of great change and innovation. Without repeating here the findings of countless medical historians, it was a period when classical philosophers-turned-physicians such as Hippocrates and Galen were rediscovered (Nutton 1981, 16-17). Furthermore, new work in what would become the distinct sub-discipline of anatomy was beginning to challenge (perhaps against the authors’ intentions) earlier models of medical knowledge. Vesalius’ work traditionally represents the turning point, the overthrow of Galenic comparative analogical anatomy based on animals in favour of human dissection” (Nutton 1981, 18). The decision to dissect human corpses instead of animals to learn about the structure and function of the human body and the results, which overturned an ever-growing number of Galen’s findings, began to eat away at the foundations of classical understandings of medicine.
Exactly what Montaigne knew about the medical discoveries and processes of his day leads to some speculation. Bernoulli (1983, 325) maintains that Montaigne’s private library contained at least a dozen medical texts, a fact that would be quite in keeping with the tendency for men of his status to be somewhat well read on matters medical, for vernacular manuals of health (as opposed to university textbooks) were aimed at lay audiences (Slack 1979). References to Paracelsus, Fioravanti and Argenterio (Montaigne 2001, 1206n), three physicians whom the essayist judged to be changing the medical paradigm for the worse for their rejection of humoral theory, appear in The Essays.​[1]​ Mentions of other physicians, notably those he consulted at the various baths and springs he visited in his travels, also dot the Journal de Voyage (Brunyate 1981). It is certainly fair to say that what information about medicine Montaigne did possess, allowed him a broad sense of the changes taking place in the field. 
Pender (2005), Losse (2010), and Brunyate (1981) all contend that claims to universalism through the increasingly scientific orientation to medicine are among Montaigne’s biggest objections to the trajectory of the field during the Renaissance. Montaigne “impugn[s] the universalism of medical theory and anatomy with the tractable experience of his own embodiment” (Pender 2005, 235-6). Brunyate similarly argues that “he really cannot conceive of, or see any need for, scientific method” (1981, 37). Yet it was the empirical trend within medical science, founded by developments in not only anatomical knowledge, but in the practice of anatomy as a discipline, that was moving medicine as a whole toward a more empirical approach based on direct observation rather than theory. Montaigne appeared to be conscious of this movement on some level, for he favorably compares surgery to medicine: “C’est par là que la chirurgie me semble beaucoup plus certaine, parce qu’elle voit et manie ce qu’elle fait; il y a moins à conjecturer et à deviner” (1209). [“That is why surgery always seems to me to be more exact: it sees and feels its way along; there is less conjecture and guesswork” (874)]. Montaigne thus presents us with one of many uncertainties in his thought relating not only to health and medicine, but also to the evolution of medicine toward increasingly scientific methods. On the one hand science is scorned as secondary to what one can glean from one’s own embodied experience, and on the other, this same praise for empiricism is extended to the surgeons who use what they have observed and felt when opening up the bodies to articulate new scientific theories.
Anatomy’s perceived assault on traditional medicine ought to be understood in the context of what a weakening of Galenic and Hippocratic tenets means for the larger matter of humoral medicine. I will, however, take a moment to insist on the perceived disruption to the Galenic paradigm because the new anatomical discoveries were neither conceived of by their instigators, nor supposed at the time to be total ruptures with Galenism. Fisch notes that Vesalius regarded “his reformation of anatomy as a renaissance,” not a revolution (1943, 215) and Nutton contends that anatomy and Galenic medicine could coexist quite well for they were not inherently contradictory (1981, 18). To disprove or question even aspects of the theories and methods on which Galenic medicine is based nevertheless shakes the faith that people have in the concept of the humors being responsible for not only physiological conditions, but also for disposition and temperament. One might therefore explain the recent scholarly drive to show anatomy’s continuity with rather than the rupture from classical medicine as a correction of the earlier narrative, the one that upholds the new study of human anatomy as a sort of watershed moment. Pender (2005), for instance, takes great pains to explore how anatomists defined themselves, their work, and its philosophical implications, notably that anatomy is not about excluding considerations of the soul, but seeing the body as a surface on which these ephemeral aspects of existence are made manifest. 




The variable opinions that characterize Montaigne’s thoughts on matters medical are taken up very prominently in discussions of how the mind and body interact to promote or impede health, for he appears to position himself against assertions of certainty relating to the physical body in matters of health. For Montaigne, as for the vast majority of those with some medical knowledge, the interconnectedness of the mind and the body was one of those notions that was so engrained that it was at the basis of not only philosophy and medicine, but of language itself. Words such as humeur and patient, in French as in their English equivalents, have meanings that refer simultaneously to mental characteristics and to a medical context.​[2]​ The humors denoted the substances within the body that regulated not only physiological health, but which were also responsible for governing temperament. As anybody who has experienced the overbooked schedule of most physicians can attest, patient is an all too apt designation for one who is receiving medical care. The semantic overlaps between the mental and the medical undoubtedly have much to do with the importance of humoral medicine, itself rooted in philosophy, in shaping Western thought. Steven Dworkin (2005, 371) nonetheless argues for a more specific understanding of this language in which, in romance languages in particular, verbs meaning to think gradually took on the meanings of to care for, to care about or to take care of. This is evident in cases such the English verb to mind which can be used in both the sense of to object or to be bothered by something as well as to care for, for instance in relation to children.
For Montaigne, such semantic overlaps permit a great deal of playfulness. In “De la ressemblance des enfants aux pères,” [“On the resemblance of children to their fathers”] perhaps his most famous essay on matters medical, he muses, in reference to physicians, “Combien en voyons-nous d’entr’eux, être de mon humeur?” (1220) [“How many of the doctors we know share this humour of mine?” (882)] about his suspicion of physicians and the dubious prescriptions they have to assign to others, but not necessarily to themselves. The question, if taken as an inquiry into the attitudes of practitioners for their art, fits within the general context of the essay and references a matter of opinion. It nevertheless takes on a particularly personal meaning given that Montaigne had just enumerated the many contemporary treatments for kidney stones: baths in natural springs, ingestion of mineral water, modification of the diet, prescriptions for expensive and exotic remedies of all sorts, and, likely the most objectionable for a sufferer of the condition, the non-sterile, non-anesthetized surgery that involved threading a thin, hooked instrument into the urethra to retrieve stones that would not pass. Should a doctor share Montaigne’s humoral balance and thus suffer the same affliction, would he be equally as reticent as the author to submit unquestioningly to medical authority and its dubious, ineffectual, and potentially harmful cures? 
The medical profession’s penchant for exotic therapies over time-tested remedies similarly prompts an exasperated toying with the notion of patience required of those who submit to medical care. After ridiculing the absolute faith that doctors (and their gullible patients) place in new cures simply because the treatments in question are unusual, undoubtedly more expensive (and thus for some better), he quips: “Je vous laisse à penser où en est le pauvre patient!” (1206) [I leave you to imagine where that leave the wretched patient” (873).] This exclamation of doubt and dissatisfaction expresses sympathy (as well as a bit of incredulity for his poor compatriot) at the same time as it suggests that he is neither patient enough to tolerate such practices nor a patient of those whom he would assuredly have called charlatans. That this admonition comes in the same sentence as a reference to some of the great medical innovators of his time, notably Paracelsus, highlights his disdain for those who would eschew entire systems of thought and practice to foreground their own ideas.​[3]​
The repeated use of semantically plural or ambiguous terms was also facilitated by a suppleness within the orthography of the French language that has since been erased. Before the Académie Française codified the French language and standardized its spelling with its first complete dictionary in 1694, words that are now considered homophones could be used virtually interchangeably. For instance, the noun pe/ansement, spelled alternately with an “a” or an “e” denoted both a thought or cognition and a bandage or dressing for a wound. Likewise the verb pe/anser meant both to think and to bandage, or in a more general sense, to care for.  Writers of Montaigne’s era therefore did not systematically employ the orthographic distinction of pansement/panser (with the a) for the curative and pensement/penser (with the e) for the cognitive. As such, any textual reference to one spelling and meaning could just as easily point to the other. The unstable orthography of renaissance French represents a connection between cognition and care that is itself reflective of a more unified way of thinking about the body and the mind in matters of health.
The link between the cognitive and the curative is teased out most deliberately in Montaigne’s 25th essay from the second volume, “De ne contrefaire le malade” [“On not pretending to be ill”]. This short treatise is only infrequently cited in studies concerning themselves with Montaigne’s views on medicine despite the fact (as per John Lyons’ (2006) writing on the subject) that it deals with many of the same questions raised in the more Stoic of his essays on health. The very deliberate punning here is upon the intertwined meanings of pe/ansement and pe/anser.  The musing comes first in the form of an anecdote about a group of English noblemen on a mission in France.  The men, engaged in both reconnaissance and subterfuge, would each bandage an eye so as to pretend to have limited sight. Their logic held that appearing disabled allow them to be dismissed as innocuous civilians in hostile territory and thus be left alone by the French.  The story of the infiltrators, while presented as a stand-alone incident, nevertheless references an earlier case of the unwarranted bandaging of eyes, in this instance of a man declared outlaw who fled Rome using the same disguise, but who discovered, once out of harm’s way, that he had lost sight in the same eye that he had concealed. As part of a larger discussion of how the mind affects the body, Montaigne diagnoses this man’s sudden disability as a case of the mind causing the body to respond and adapt to its affectation.  
It is nevertheless once Montaigne sets about linking the two stories that his punning draws attention to itself as a rhetorical device. “Je me suis souvent chatouillé de ce pensement, qu’il leur eût pris, comme à ces autres, et qu’ils se fussent trouvés tous éborgnés au revoir des maîtresses pour lesquelles ils avaient fait l’entreprise” (1065). [“I have often been obsessed by the thought that it may have befallen them as it did to those others and that when they came back to greet the ladies for whose sake they had done such deeds they would all have become blind in one eye” (782).] The essayist comments that he is amused by thought that the English infiltrators might find themselves suffering bodily harm as a result the same mind-body connection that had caused the ancient man’s partial blindness. His laugh at the expense of the English comes first from the supposedly clever ruse’s risk of backfiring, which would negate any favor the cunning plan was meant to curry from the mistresses. Insult would be added to injury should they, just as the man fleeing the Romans, have to return from battle as the humiliated victims of their own tactics. In this interpretation of “chatouillé” [tickled,] a word that itself takes on the connotations of both the mental and the physical, Montaigne’s “pensement” implies a cognitive meaning because it denotes an entertaining idea—literally a brain tickling notion. The tickling, however, also indicates a physical sensation akin to the one the bandages, the symbol of subterfuge, would produce on the delicate skin around the eyes.  In this iteration, Montaigne imagines the “pensement” (bandage) on his own eyes, doubling the meaning such that “pensement” takes on the connotations of what in modern French is designated by the homophonic variant “pansement.”  It is therefore the thought (pensement) of the bandage (pansement) and its implications that so amuses him.
While this first pun on pa/ensement is light-hearted, matters become far more serious by the end of the essay when Montaigne again leans on the dual implication of the root word penser: “Si nous ne commençons de bonne heure à nous panser, quand aurons nous pourvu à tant de plaies et à tant de maux?  Si avons-nous une très douce médecine que la philosophie” (1067). [“If we do not soon start to dress our wounds, when shall we ever cure them and their evils? Yet philosophy provides the sweetest of cures” (783).] The counsel is to care for the body in the physiological sense, but also through its homophonic variant, to take the time to reflect upon one’s condition in a more philosophical manner as a form of medicine. Montaigne thus uses the experiences of the eye-bandagers as a humorous introduction to his more considered views on the psychosomatic relationship. In doing so he also expounds the virtues of his own regime of self-care: medical treatment for his (genuine as opposed to feigned) ailments, awareness of his bodily condition gained through self-appraisal, and philosophy. 
For the physical matters (discussed elsewhere in The Essays), Montaigne sought out treatments for kidney stones, which included modifications of his diet, the ingestion of mineral waters and visits to some of Europe’s most renowned baths and springs. These therapies are extensively documented in his Journal de voyage, the travel journal in which he recounts in very precise, almost clinical language the stones he expelled and the palliative strategies he employed. Margaret Healy (2005) views this text as an early modern pathography, which is to say that it allowed for a reimagining of the self in the face of illness. Insofar as the act of writing about his physical condition brought about an even greater attention to the self, the Travel Journal and also The Essays fulfill the second part of Montaigne’s regime of care. Pathography, a genre characterized by a narrative of illness that is personal and often oppositional in its description of the medical profession, is often cited as promoting better health. ​[4]​ Healy (2005, 241) contends that Montaigne’s journal allowed him to reclaim the experience of illness from the medical professionals who provided neither relief nor confidence in their abilities to do so and thus facilitated “emotional healing”.
The Essays, while pathographically curative, is also a philosophical work by which Montaigne endeavors to better know himself and in so doing functions as part of a more general philosophical therapy. This therapy is described in Foucault’s (1986) Care of the Self, which summarizes the teachings and prescriptions of philosophers, but also of those who are now most remembered as physicians—notably Hippocrates and Galen—for mental (dream analysis, seeking out the counsel of others, reading, writing) and physical  (diet, exercise, satisfaction of the passions) health. Philosophy, particularly of this applied nature, functions as the source of counsel on matters of health, but also becomes the medicine itself, for as Lyons (2006) argues, philosophy is a form of meditation in the stoic tradition of modifying one’s perceptions of physiological situations as a way to promote health. The early intervention and continuity of care through philosophy that Montaigne counseled above thereby works with the “understanding that mind-body therapies are not ‘magic bullets’ that work in the short term but are instead rooted in beliefs, habits, attitudes, and practice” (Lyons 2006, 528). 
If Montaigne takes great pains to highlight the role of philosophy and the mind in medicine, it is likely because the mind was—and as patient-advocates today argue, is—
frequently overlooked. It is this premise that he takes up in “De l’inconstance de nos actions,” [“On the inconstancy of our actions”] in which he relays Plutarch’s story of a valiant soldier whose commander, Antigonus, had had him treated for a chronic illness. Once the soldier had recovered from the curative intervention however, the commander was upset that the brave man, whose perfect health and fighting form were rewards for his military prowess, had become cowardly: 
Antigonus ayant pris en affection un de ses soldats, pour sa vertu et vaillance, commanda à ses médecins de le panser d’une maladie longue et interieure, qui l’avait tourmenté longtemps : et s’apercevant après sa guérison, qu’il allait beaucoup plus froidement aux affaires, lui demanda qui l’avait ainsi changé et encouardie : Vous même, Sire, lui répondit-il, m’ayant déchargé des maux, pour lesquels je ne tenais compte de ma vie (538).

[Antigonus had grown to love one of his soldiers for his virtue and valour and ordered his doctors to treat him for a malignant internal complains which had long tormented him; he noticed that, once the soldier was cured, he set about his work with much less ardour and asked him who had changed him into such a coward. ‘You yourself, sire,’ he replied, ‘by freeing me from the weight of those pains which made me think life was worth nothing’ (376).]

The soldier’s response, that the illness had been a driving force behind his prowess, rests on the premise that the mind will naturally command the body to safeguard something—good health—that is worth protecting. The commander had failed to consider that the mind has the capacity to “overrule” the body whereas the soldier had used this premise to his physical advantage and turned an impediment into an asset.  In Montaigne’s retelling of Antigonus’ story, like in his musing on the partially-blinded men, those who would outsmart adversaries and disrupt the balance between the mental and the physical that prevails in its natural state are pronounced guilty of treating the body (panser) without first thinking (penser) of the mind-body relationship. 
	The unanticipated responses from either the body or the mind when the other is altered via medical intervention are frequently relayed through anecdotes concerning others. Montaigne, however, in keeping with the idea that self-reflection and philosophy are keys to good health, also makes himself the focus of these often humorous observations. In response to the accidental blinding of the eye-bandagers in “De ne contrefaire le malade,” Montaigne offers up his own seemingly superior mastery of his body: 
De tout temps j’ai appris de charger ma main et à cheval et à pied, d’une baguette ou d’un bâton : jusques à y chercher de l’élégance, et m’en sojourner d’une contenance affectée. Plusiurs m’ont menacé, que fortune tournerait un jour cette mignardise en nécessité. Je me fonde sur ce que je serais le permier goutteux de ma race (1066).

[Whether riding or walking I have always been used to burdening my hand with a cane or a stick, even affecting an air of elegance by leaning on it with a distinguished look on my face. Several people have warned me that one day Fortune may change this affectation into a necessity. I comfort myself with the thought that, if so, I would be the first of my tribe to get the gout! (782)]

He describes his own affectation of walking with a cane and seems confident that despite his behavior he will not develop gout (a condition that would cause people to limp) because there is no family history of the disease. The recourse to heredity, although it predates modern understandings of genetics, suggests a physical reason to be dismissive of the concerns raised. As presented to the reader, within an essay on the mind’s power to cause change in the body, heredity nevertheless functions just as much as a rationalization that reassures Montaigne of his unlikeliness of developing gout as it does a physiological reason for his continued ability to walk unencumbered. “Heredity” is the means by which the author differentiates himself from the devious eye-bandagers who eventually required the medical prostheses or objects of care that they used as a disguise. The reassurance therefore acts as an affirmation that the mind can prevail over the body. 
The discourse of heredity in Montaigne’s writing alternates between ambivalence about the principle’s role in the transmission (or non-transmission) of physical ailments and conviction of its involvement in the inheritance of emotional or mental dispositions. Given that science is still seeking to explain the role of heredity in determining what is passed from parents to children, Montaigne appeared to be exercising a sort of healthy skepticism in his more celebrated musings on inherited traits in “De la ressemblance des enfants aux pères”. 
In this essay, Montaigne traces the family tree of sufferers to suggest an etiology for kidney stones that is, at least to the modern reader, far more physiological than psychosomatic. Great pains are taken to link his disease to his father’s similar sufferings to underscore its seemingly inescapable nature. Yet amidst this apparent acceptance of the dictates of heredity, which refer even to the semen that would have carried the predisposition, Montaigne questions the process of transmission and points out that heredity is a phenomenon that adhered to no known logic or science available to him or his contemporaries. He asks how it is that he could have inherited a disease from which his father did not suffer until long after his son’s birth: 
J’étais né vingt-cinq ans et plus, avant sa maladie … Où se couvait tant de temps, la propension à ce défaut? Et lorsqui’il était si loin du mal, cette légère pièce de sa substance, de quoi il me bâtit, comment en portrait-elle pour sa part, une si grande impression?  Et comment encore si couverte que quarante-cinq ans après, j’aie commencé à m’en ressentir? (1189)

[Now I was born twenty-five years and more before he fell ill…During all that time where did that propensity for this affliction lie a-brooding? When his own illness was still so far off, how did that piece of his own substance which went to make me manage to transmit so marked a characteristic to me? And how was it so hidden that I only began to be aware of it forty-five years later? (864)]

Amidst this doubt about the heredity of physiological conditions, he makes a stronger case for an “inherited” distaste for and suspicion of doctors. The genealogy of mistrust of medicine is linked not just to the father, but goes as far back as the great grandfather: 
Que les médecins excusent un peu ma liberté: car par cette meme infusion et insinuation fatale, j’ai reçu le haine et le mépris de leur doctrine. Cette antipathie, que j’ai à leur art, m’est héréditaire. Mon père a vécu soixante et quatorze ans, mon aïeul soixante et neuf, mon bisaïeul près de quatre-vingts, sans avoir gouté aucune sorte de medicine (1189-90).

[Doctors will have to pardon my liberty a while, but from that same ejaculation and penetration I was destined to receive my loathing and contempt for their dogmas: my antipathy to their Art is hereditary: my father lived to seventy-four, my grandfather to sixty-nine, my great-grand-father to nearly eighty; none have swallowed any kind of drug (864).]

Although the kidney stones are here also recognized as having afflicted four generations in Montaigne’s family, it is the aversion to physicians that dominates the discourse of heredity; indeed it is only in passing that the disease is even mentioned, for the essay continues—almost in its entirety—on the perils of medicine. What is inherited, therefore, seems to be an attitude toward the care of the self that rejects the extreme, often exotic and unproven, measures of physicians in favor of regimes of self-care as practiced by his forbearers. By renaissance logic, it is far more reasonable to inherit a particular attitude or disposition—something that would be regulated by the humors and which would have been “present” in the father at the time of the son’s conception—than it would be to inherit an ailment that had not yet appeared. As for heredity itself, the concept proves variable, being both a benefit and a liability. It also emerges, at least in its psychological aspects, as something that could be explained using the scientific concepts of the day, but which would (will) take several hundred years to be fully understood in its physiological sense. 
Montaigne’s well-documented resistance to the professional practice of medicine, like heredity, also risks adverse effects. According to the logic of the mind influencing the body laid out in earlier essays, his antipathy toward medicine and this distrust of the cures makes him resistant to those treatments he does undertake and the recommendations he chooses to adopt. He chides doctors who seek to place the blame for failed treatments on their patients and produces a mocking list of excuses for a the lack of results: 
Il a découvert son bras, il a ouï le bruit d’un coche … on a tentrouvert sa fenêtre, il s’est couché sur le côté gauche, ou passé par sa tête quelque pensement pénible (1197-98).

[‘he bared his arm’; ‘he heard the noise of a coach’… ‘somebody opened a window’; ‘he has been lying on his left side’; ‘he has let painful thoughts run through his head’ (868-9).]

By placing the pretext of a patient’s distressing thoughts at the end of the physician’s litany of excuses for not bringing about the desired cure, he provides the pensement with a privileged position as the definitive reason for a treatment to fail. His own extensive meditations on the ineffectiveness of physician-prescribed cures and his belief in the hereditary legitimacy of such a position would, however, be just as likely to prevent cure as faith in heredity would be to save him from gout. In her article on the state of medical practice and medical knowledge in the latter half of the 16th century, Nutton (1981, 25) reminds us that medicine as far back as Hippocrates maintained that the patient had to believe in the cure. These beliefs hold true today in the phenomenon of the placebo effect and underscore what Talcott Parsons (1951) upholds as one of the four tenets of the sick role, which is that treatment is undertaken with a view to recovering. Montaigne’s numerous pensements pénibles [painful thoughts] about the at best ineffective and at worst harmful treatments that have been recommended to him make it not only possible but likely that the supposedly beneficial act of philosophizing may be countering its own curative ends. 
This latest musing on the interaction between the body and the mind in matters relating to health exemplifies Montaigne’s characteristically ambivalent stance on many issues. More to the point, the apparent contradiction it creates is emblematic of his very argument when it comes to the role of the mind and the body. Determining which is more important in creating, maintaining, or restoring health depends on the person and the circumstances. In some cases, these variables are material, but in others, as seems to be the case here, the circumstances depend entirely on the point one is trying to make. In embracing rather than denying, refuting or even problematizing the psychosomatic relationship, Montaigne signals that attempts to divorce the mind from the body risk oversimplifying complex matters and in so doing, risk ill health.

*    *    *





Bernoulli, R. 1983. Aperçu sur la place de Montaigne dans l’histoire de la médicine. 
In Montaigne et les Essais; 1580-1980; Actes du congrès de Bordeaux, juin 1980, ed. François Moureau, Robert Granderoute and Claude Blum, 323-335. Paris: Champion.

Brunyate, M. 1981. Montaigne and medicine. In Montaigne and his age, ed. 
	Keith Cameron, 15-25. Exeter, University of Exeter Press.

Charon, R. 2006. Narrative medicine: honoring the stories of illness. Oxford: Oxford 
	University Press.

Dworkin, S. 2005. From ‘thinking’ to ‘caring’: The semantic evolution of Lat. 	cogitare and curare in Hispano-Romance. In Studies in Ibero-Romance 
	linguistics: Dedicated to Ralph Penny, ed. Roger Wright and Peter 
	Ricketts, 363-374. Newark, Deleware: Juan de La Cuesta.

Fisch, M.H. 1943. Vesalius and his book.” Bulletin of the Medical Library
Association 31.3: 208-221.

Foucault, M. 1986. The History of sexuality, vol. 3, The care of the self.  Trans.
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage—Random.

Frank, A. 1995. The wounded storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics. Chicago: 
	University of Chicago Press.

Hunsaker-Hawkins, A. 1999. Reconstructing illness: Studies in pathography, 2nd ed. 
	West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press.

Healy, M. 2005. Journeying with the ‘stone’: Montaigne’s healing Travel 
	Journal. Literature and Medicine 24. 2: 231-249.

Losse, D.N. 2010. The old world meets the new in Montaigne’s Essais: The 
	nexus of syphilis, cannibalism, and empirical Medicine. Montaigne Studies 22: 
	85-99.

Lyons, J.D. 2006. Meditation and the inner voice. New Literary History 37.3:	525-
	538.

Montaigne, Michel de. 1924. Les essais. Ed. Pierre Villey. 3 vols. Paris: Presses 
	Universitaires de France.

---. 1955. Journal de voyage en Italie par la Suisse et L’Allemagne en 
	1580 et 1581. Ed.Maurice Rat. Paris: Editions Garnier Frères.

---. 1993. The complete essays. Ed. and trans. M. A. Screech. London: Penguin.

---. 2001. Les essais. Ed. Jean Céard. Paris: Librairie Générale Française.

Nutton, V. 1981. Medicine in the Age of Montaigne. In Montaigne and his age, ed. 
	Keith Cameron, 15-25. Exeter, University of Exeter Press.

Parsons, T. 1951. The social system. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe.

Pender, S. 2005. Signs of interiority, or epistemology in the bodyshop. The 
	Dalhousie Review 2: 221-237.

Pennebaker, J. W. 2000. Telling stories: The health benefits of narrative. Literature 
and Medicine 19.1: 3-18. 

Slack, P. 1979. Mirrors of health and treasures of poor men: The uses of the 
	vernacular medical literature of Tudor England.” In Health medicine and 
	mortality in the sixteenth century, ed. Charles Webster, 227-273. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Vesalius, A. 1998. On the fabric of the human body. Vol. 1. : The bones and 














^1	  Hereafter, all references to the French version of Les Essais refer to the 2001 Céard edtion, unless otherwise noted, and will be designated solely with the page number. Any accompanying English translations will be drawn from Screech’s translation (1993) and will be similarly designated only by the page number.
^2	  Sain, the French adjective for both “healthy” and “sane” reflects not only the overlap of cognitive and curative meanings, but moreover emphasizes the tension between these two fields that is inherent in any matter of what is now recognized as mental health.
^3	  One could argue that Montaigne’s omission of Vesalius in this list of three “reckless” innovators suggests that he sees the anatomist (much like Vesalius argued of himself) as working within an existing paradigm and not as disregarding it and those who articulated it in the first instance. 
^4	  The literature on curative aspects of pathography (Frank 1995; Hunsaker-Hawkins 1999; Charon 2006) itself hinges on a binary of physical and psychological effects. Some scholars, such as James Pennebaker (2000), cite scientific studies where patients who write about their condition or their stresses experience appreciable improvements in immune function, pain, medication use and lung function. A good deal of work also centers on the anecdotal accounts of patients who feel better or more empowered by recounting and writing the stories of their illness.
